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Abstract 
Luckhardt, H., New formally undecidable propositions: non-trivial lower bounds on proof 
complexity and related theorems, Theoretical Computer Science 83 (1991) 169-188. 
Within a formal theory T where a I-rule is provably valid and Gdel’s second incompleteness 
theorem holds, it is not possible to prove any non-trivial lower bound LB, on proof complexity. 
Most calculi currently used in formalizing proofs are of this type. We give many sets of formulas 
where non-trivial lower bounds LB, are assumed in a simple way. Thus we have a new large 
class of formally undecidable mathematical propositions. To this we add the well-known theorems 
of recursive undecidability and proof speed-ups of T as well as examples resulting from proof- 
theoretic @-uniformity. Our examples also show that the formalistic goal of computing the “whole 
accessible mathematical world” is not attainable in a mathematically satisfactory way: the above 
mentioned LB&{ F,}) with F,, provable in T can only be formally decided using known methods 
in extensions T’ of T if almost all F,, are assumed as axioms in T’. Such a completion T’ practically 
amounts to listing and not proving theorems. Finally we see that Cook’s thesis NP# P implies 
the existence of { F,} c TAUT having a lower bound LB,({F,,}) of an order of growth comparable 
to that in our examples. This is new evidence for the validity of Cook’s conjecture. A proof of 
this conjecture has to overcome the proof-theoretic difficulty that if validity + is replaced by 
provability t, in T, then this NP # P-variant cannot be proved in T. 
1. Introduction and results 
Giidel’s incompleteness theorems are of far-reaching significance (see [12]). Our 
paper contributes to the following questions. 
* The main results of this paper were obtained in 1984. I am obliged to A. Ferebee for help with the 
English version. 
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(I) What mathematical propositions can be shown undecidable in a formal 
theory T using GBdel’s arguments? 
(II) Is a weakened version of the goals of formalism attainable? 
(III) Is there a relation between Godel’s incompleteness theorems and Cook’s 
thesis NP # P? 
We proceed roughly as follows. We start (in Section 2) from a description of Giidel’s 
ideas. Then we develop our new examples of undecidable propositions: non-trivial 
lower bounds LBT on proof complexity in T; in Section 6 we add related well-known 
meta-theorems. Next we discuss a weakened formalistic program for formalizing 
the accessible mathematical world by adjoining new axioms. We consider two 
versions of “new” and show that, as far as we can see today, the first version yields 
an impossible program and the second one amounts to a mathematically unaccep- 
table weakening of the program. This describes a stronger form of incompleteness 
than is usually considered. Finally we prove that NP# P implies non-trivial LBT. 
Now we will describe our results in more detail. They concern recursively enumer- 
able I-calculi. These are theories where the I-rule (F, 1FtG) is provably valid 
under canonical codings [ 11, p. 1541. Most calculi considered today are of this type; 
there is a schematic proof of the I-rule as a natural deduction or in the style of 
Frege and Hilbert. Those Rosser-calculi T which use Kreisel’s variant of Rosser’s 
original proof predicate [ 11, pp. 154-1551 are also of this type because they prove 
their own consistency ConT. It is not known whether this holds for Rosser’s original 
proof predicate. On the other hand, Gentzen-like calculi such as Kreisel and Takeuti’s 
cut-free analysis CFA [ 131 are recursively enumerable calculi but not -L-calculi (see 
Section 3). They are useful for theoretical purposes but proofs in these systems, if 
not restricted, are generally long. 
Our second basic notion is that of non-trivial proof complexity lower bound 
LB,,(F,) with respect to a sequence F.+ = (F,,),,, of formulas and a function I+!J. 
In typical cases LB=,+(F.+) holds if all proofs of each F,, in T have a length of at 
least cCl(n, IF,I) h w ere $( n, x) -x is unbounded on the sequence x = IF,, as n + ~0, 
and IF,, is the length of the formula F,,. 
In this section T is assumed to be a I-calculus unless otherwise stated. In Section 
3 we prove the following results. 
(A) Con, is equivalent to a non-trivial LB=. Thus: 
(Bl) In any T where Giidel’s second incompleteness theorem holds no non-trivial 
LB7 is provable. 
(B2) In Rosser-Kreisel-calculi (see above) non-trivial LBT are derivable. 
In addition we have: 
(B3) If essential facts about a projection of T into an arbitrary theory S are 
provable in T then (Bl) can be generalized to the underivability of LBs in T. 
(B4) In Gentzen-like calculi S nearly quadratic LBSI are provable. Because these 
S are recursively enumerable this only holds for certain classes of formulas and 
proofs. Details are still open. 
These global results are complemented in Section 4 by concrete examples. 
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(C) According to our experience (see Section 6.1), in each stronger mathematical 
theory T there are many sequences F.+ of formulas such that non-trivial LB,(F,) 
are valid. In theories T where Godel’s second incompleteness theorem holds, these 
formulas LB,(F,) are a new type of formally undecidable mathematical proposi- 
tions. Later in Section 6 we add well-known theorems which imply such non-trivial 
LBT( F,): recursive undecidability and proof speed-ups as well as examples resulting 
from proof-theoretic II:-uniformity (see Section 2). 
We can make stronger statements about existing calculi because we are able to 
locate certain occurrences of symbols in each proof of F, which are sufficient for 
non-trivial LB7. It is enough when terms or variables which will be quantified later 
in the proof already “represent” these quantifiers at all earlier stages. 
(D) In all known mathematical theories T where Godel’s second incompleteness 
theorem holds, these formal constraints cause many sequences of provable formulas 
F,, to have non-trivial and thus unprovable LBT(F*). The only way we know to 
decide such LB.+(F,) formally in an extension T+ of T when the formulas F,, 
cannot be proved from subformulas is to take almost all of them as axioms or as 
quasi-axioms whose derivations from axioms are of limited complexity and do not 
involve any analysis of quantifiers; then lLB,+( G,) is easily proved in Ti having 
enough arithmetic for all infinite subsequences G, of F*. These F,, can be taken 
from suitably chosen subclasses determined either by the meaning or by the form 
of the formulas (e.g. first-order approximations or Boolean formulas). 
The results mentioned thus far are all related to question (1) and result (D) also 
contains an answer to question (II). A weakened formalistic proposal consists of 
repeated completion of an incomplete theory by choosing suitable new axioms in 
such a way that as much as possible results already obtained informally become 
formally decidable. (Note that by Godel’s result one cannot add all formulas whose 
validity we already know without destroying recursive enumerability, for example, 
the Gijdel sentences of all consistent r.e. extensions of T.) We distinguish two 
versions of completing theories: a pure completion which adds only valid but hitherto 
underivable formulas as quasi-axioms, and a free completion which adjoins arbitrary 
valid formulas. We now apply these concepts to the LB,+-theorems in (D). Because 
all LBr+( G,) are only formally decidable in Tt when almost all F,, become 
quasi-axioms in T+, the following stronger form of incompleteness holds. 
(E) The weakened formalistic ideal of repeated (recursively enumerable) comple- 
tions which adjoins as much as possible at each step cannot be carried out as a 
pure completion by any known means, and a free completion degenerates as far as 
we can see today to a mere listing of theorems (as quasi-axioms). 
The mathematical defects of such a listing are evident. In particular, we mention: 
(a) Methods, proofs and their data are lost. (For a mathematical result proved 
with the use of “lost” data see [14].) 
(b) The set of axioms becomes undecidable and if we assume NPf P then even 
TAUT becomes just a list. 
Thus in evaluating languages as well as deductions, precision and completeness are 
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not decisive per se, but rather the mathematical signijicance of what has been singled 
out; this is in contrast to the original orientation of formalism. 
Finally in Section 5 we prove two results concerning question (III). 
(Fl) Assuming NP # P, each polynomially axiomatizable theory T has recursive 
sequences F* c TAUT with non-trivial LB,(F,) of an order of growth similar to 
our examples in (D) (whose order of growth we proved without using Cook’s thesis 
or other similar assumptions). 
Thus our LB,-examples confirm an infinite set of non-trivial consequences of 
Cook’s thesis and so support it in a new way (of course our support is indirect 
as is all other support so far). On the other hand when the arguments used to 
prove (Fl) are formalized in T we see difficulties that a proof of NP # P would have 
to overcome. 
(F2) Let (NP # P)T denote the formula SAT& P (arithmetically expressed in T) 
where validity + is replaced by provability kr in T. Then this variant of NPZ P 
(which is equivalent to NP# P outside T) is underivable in every polynomially 
axiomatizable T where Godel’s second incompleteness theorem holds. 
2. GSdel’s arguments today 
Consider formal theories T and their arithmetizations (letting [A] be the number 
of the formula A) such that the following holds: 
(i) T is consistent and recursively enumerable. 
(ii) T allows the usual codings; in particular T has a primitive recursive predicate 
q T(x, [F]) expressing canonically “x is (the number of) a proof of F in T” and 
a primitive recursive substitution function sub with the meaning sub( [A(v)], ii) = 
[A(3)]. We abb reviate q T(x, IF]) by q T(x, F) and Vx q iT(x, F) by q lrF. 
(iii) T is closed under the following two derivability conditions (Bernays, Godel, 
Loeb): 
(Dl) ~-F*+PRA 0~6 
(D2) +T,PRA F+ q ,F for FEZ:, 
where PRA denotes primitive recursive arithmetic. 
The usual proofs of (Dl) and (D2) imitate the given proof and a standard 
computation of F in T and PRA, respectively. Before 1973 provable modus ponens 
was also used, thus excluding Gentzen calculi. In 1973 Jeroslov [9] was able to 
show that (Dl) and (D2) suffice. His proof uses a complicated sub-function 
sub'(rA(~)l, P-l)= IA(f(Lfl))l involving numbers of function graphs thus reflect- 
ing diagonalization under [ 1. This has been simplified to the usual subfunction 
(following Godel’s intentions) in [13, pp. 15, 441, a fact we recognized after having 
done it independently. 
Logical fixed points. ~-T,PRA cp t, F( [cp]) where cp = F(sub(g, g)) mui g= 
[F(sub(v, ~111. 
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Proof. [q 1= sub(g, g). 
Godel’s famous “liar” is an immediate consequence. 
t rPRA AT@ lOTAT with AT = lLl-,(sub(g, g)) 
and g= [lCl,(sub(u, II))]. (1) 
Remark. Because of this fixed point result a global notion Tr of truth in T is not 
possible: bag Tr( [r]) H 7, where T is a fixed point of 1Tr (Tarski). 
Giidel’s first incompleteness theorem. VT AT. 
Proof. Otherwise kT q T AT by (Dl) and ETIAT by (1). Contradiction! 0 
Note that AT. is valid in the standard interpretation because 1Ar is false 
by (1). To formalize this idea one needs global X:-consistency Con, = 
TV FEE~(O#A q ,(lF)) where the quantifier V FEZ: ranges over codes for 
I;:-formulas. Outside T, by X:-completeness, local consistency is equivalent to 
TTY-reflection: 
A F~lly((k,F)*F valid) ti bLTI. 
We formalize the non-trivial part of the proof. 
t- T,PRA ConTAnT(iVyFo(y)) + ivy Fo( y) for decidable F, . (2) 
Proof. 
ConT A q T(~VY F,(Y)) A VY C(y) + q T(VY F,(Y)) by 032) 
+ 1. 
(3) 
Proof. Con, A OrA, + AT by (2); and hence using (1) Con, A iAT+ AT. 
GSdel’s second incompleteness theorem. VT ConT. 
Proof. Combine (3) and Godel’s first incompleteness theorem. 0 
It is redundant to say that Con T is valid in the standard model. Thus AT and 
ConT are formally undecidable in the usual theories. Note that the proof above 
uses the Gijdel sentence AT literally. 
The conditions treated so far are standard for stronger theories. For interesting 
weak theories, Godel’s second theorem also holds (see [2]). Next we discuss some 
@-properties first introduced by Kreisel (see [19,5.2] where provable modus ponens 
is used). 
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KI;-consequences of consistency. (2) and (Dl) yield: c,FJ kpRA Con,+ F for 
F EII~. Thus l-I:-theorems can be proved PRA-elementarily from suitable ConT- 
axioms. Interesting II:-conjectures are Riemann’s hypothesis or Fermat’s last 
theorem. 
Remark. The above arguments are also valid in intuitionistic logic. 
II’-uniformity. All instances of AT and Con T can be proved in T. Hence these 
computations cannot be made uniformly in T. The following version of proof- 
theoretic l-I’-uniformity has been considered in the literature for T = PA (Peano- 
arithmetic): 
t--T Ax F(x) e Vm Ax: t,F(Z) by srn lines. 
A report on this conjecture of Kreisel is given in [lo]. 
Many of the remaining results about proof predicates (e.g. Loeb’s theorem) seem 
to need provable modus ponens or something similar. For later reference we note 
the following result of Kreisel: 
t-T icon, + F e ~~ F for FE II: and T with provable modus ponens. (4) 
We close this background section with a list of the main historical examples of 
formally undecidable propositions. 
(I) Proof-theoretic undecidable formulas: Giidel started the subject in 1931 with 
examples of paradoxical self-reference and canonical consistency Con,. Other 
principles were then reduced to Con,, for example transfinite induction up to the 
ordinal limit of T (Gentzen 1936) and the computability of the primitive and 
bar-recursive functionals of finite type for arithmetic and analysis (Godel 1958, 
Spector 1962). 
(II) Set-theoretic undecidable formulas (undecidability proved with the use of 
models): w+w is not in Zermelo’s 2; the axiom of choice and the continuum 
hypothesis are independent of ZF (Godel 1939, Cohen 1963); further examples 
concerning ZF are Souslin’s hypothesis, Whitehead’s problem, Borel’s conjecture 
and the non-existence of a definable well-ordering of [w. 
(III) Combinatorial undecidable formulas (shown undecidable with the help of 
T-majorizing functions (Kreisel)): Paris and Harrington’s (1977) variant of the finite 
Ramsey theorem is independent of Peano arithmetic PA. Harvey Friedman’s variant 
of Kruskal’s theorem is independent of predicative analysis. 
(IV) Number-theoretic undecidable formulas (shown undecidable by using T- 
majorizing ordinal notations): Goodstein’s theorem is independent of PA (Kirby 
and Paris 1982); a similar result holds for primitive recursive arithmetic PRA 
(Beckmann and McAloon, cf. [20]). 
Thus many examples of formally undecidable propositions have been given. Here 
we add the following type of mathematical statements: 
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(V) Non-trivial lower bounds on proof complexity, recursive undecidability, 
examples resulting from proof-theoretic II!-uniformity and proof speed-ups of T. 
Slisenko [ 18, p. 5991 and Schnorr’s inability conjecture IC [ 171 are forerunners 
of the results (V). 
3. Unprovable lower bounds on proof complexity 
Consider a canonical measure 11 (length) of formulas and proofs, e.g. the number 
of symbols. The basic idea which connects the foundational predicate Con, with 
practical proof complexity is the following: if in T a I-rule F, ~FI- G explicitly 
holds and if there are formulas F, in T with minimal proofs of unbounded length, 
then T is consistent. We generalize this idea and formalize it in suitable T. 
Definition. T is a I-caZcuZus iff the I-rule is provably valid in T, i.e. 
k-r q T(x, F) A q T(Y, 1F) + M&(x, Y, iGIL G) 
where &- is a function definable in T. 
Examples of I-calculi. (A) Theories explicitly containing the I-rule, e.g. natural 
deduction systems. Here instances of the I-rule are of the form 
x Y x Y 
F 1F F 1F 
~ or 
G I . 
c 
Thus in the length function l&l variables can be separated: 
I&(x, Y, Pl)i = k+b, v)l+lGl (5) 
where Ic~~(x,y)l is linear in 1x1 and (yl. 
(B) Frege-Hilbert calculi. In these calculi the I-rule has the following schematic 
form: 
Y 
1F -IF+FATF 
FA-IF Fr\TF+G 
G 
Because repeated occurrences of a formula (in particular G) can be replaced by a 
new defined symbol, (5) holds in this case too. If no defined symbols are used then 
I& = 14+‘4GI, i.e. 1~~1 is still linear in Ix], Iyl, IGI. Our arguments can easily be 
adapted to this situation. 
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(C) Rosser-Kreisel-calculi (calculi with a Rosser-like proof predicate such that 
t, Con,). These calculi satisfy the definition of I-calculus given above no matter 
what function is taken for pr because the premise of the definition is provably false. 
It is still an open question whether all of Rosser’s original calculi are of this type, 
but the variant Kreisel gives in [ll, pp. 154-1551 obviously is. 
To complete the spectrum of existing calculi we also mention the partially cut-free 
Gentzen-like systems which are not I-calculi (“partially” because our T’s are 
recursively enumerable). Kreisel and Takeuti’s cut-free analysis CFA [13] is an 
example of this sort of system. We discuss these systems at the end of this section. 
Calculi of type (A) and of type (B) are the types of systems one uses in practice, 
the unrestricted Rosser- and Gentzen-like calculi require much effort in practice 
but are very useful for theoretical purposes. 
Theorem 3.1. For arbitrary theories S, T and functions $ in S, 
t-S Con,+ /In VG AzPXs G)+ IzI> cCl(n, IGOI. 
Proof. This can be proved by taking G,, = 1. 0 
Corollary 3.2. Arbitrary lower bounds on the proof complexity of T can be proved in 
Rosser- Kreisel-calculi T, and in general for every T these bounds can be proved in the 
extension T + Con, of T. 
Definitions. Consider a sequence F.+ of formulas and a function $ in a I-calculus 
T. 
(a) LB&F,)=An, zD(z, F,)+ IzI> $(n, IFnl)l. 
(b) 4 is non-trivial with respect to T and F.+ iff 
Ax, Y Vn: +(n, IFnIl 2 IMx, Y, TFnl)i, 
where &- is the function used in the definition of “l-calculus”. 
That $ is non-trivial means that in all calculi where (5) is valid (e.g. those in (A) 
and (B)) Ax, y Vn: +(n, IFFY)* IaT(x, y)l+l~,,I holds, and this obviously is true 
when $( n, x) - x is unbounded on x = IF,, I as n + ~0. Thus LB,,(F,) expresses that 
$ is a non-trivial lower bound on proof complexity in T. (A trivial lower bound is 
one of the lowest type c + x; one has such a bound if the formulas F, have a more 
or less uniform proof of limited complexity.) 
Theorem 3.3. Consider a sequence F* of formulas and a function 4 in a I-calculus 
T such that in T it is provable that $t is non-trivial with respect to T and F.+. Then 
or LB,,(F.J + Con,. Together with (4) this yields 
+,lLBT,+(F.+.)+F j +rF forFEn: 
and T with provable modus ponens; T + lLB,,,( F*) is a fly-conservative extension 
of T. 
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Proof in T. q r(x, F) A q r(y, 1F) + q r(Pr(x, y, [F,]), F,) because T is a 
I-calculus. Take n according to the $-assumption applied to x, y; this implies 
+ IPr(X,Y, TEl>l> ~l(4~J)4%(X> Y, TEl)l 
by the LB-premise and by the assumption on $. So we obtain 
Corollary 3.4. For every I-calculus T to which Godel’s second incompleteness theorem 
applies and each T-provable non-trivial proof complexity lower bound JI with respect 
to T and a sequence F.+ of formulas: bLr LB,,(F,). 
In particular, every applied calculus of the type (A) or (B) with a certain 
arithmetical expressive power is unable to prove any non-trivial lower bound on its 
proof complexity. In other words: 
Corollary 3.5. For all I-calculi T where (5) and Godel’s second theorem hold: if 
F-T. q (z, G) + IA> (Cr(iGI) for Gf rom an infinite set M of formulas, then on all infinite 
sequences {F,,} of formulas of T in M, +I( I F,,I) s c,,,r,, + IF, I {because I/I(X) -x is 
bounded on IF,, I}. Thus for typical sets M of formulas and typical functions $ only 
trivial lower bounds on proof complexity (CI( IGI) s c + 1 GI are provable in T. 
Theorem 3.3 and its corollaries can be generalized from LBT to LBs for an 
arbitrary (not necessarily r.e.) proof system S provided enough properties of a 
projection of T into S are formalizable in T. 
Theorem 3.6. Consider a I-calculus T to which Giidel’s second theorem applies and 
a proof system S such that the following holds: 
(IX) t,Clr(~,F,,)+O~(cpx, @F,),i.e.amappingof{F,}fromTintoSisexpressible 
in T. 
(p) In Tit is derivable that cp,lxI IS monotonic, has infinite range and majorizes 1~x1. 
(y) In T it is provable that t.~z[cp,z > O( n, x)] L 1 is non-trivial with respect to T 
and F*. 
(6) In Tit isprovable that ~(n,I~~,l)~B(n,l~,l). 
Then bLr LBs,$( OF,). 
Proof in T. Suppose LB,,(@F,). Then 
&(r K)+ ~~~1x1~ lcpxl> +(n, W,l)~ e(n, IFnO 
by((-y),(P),(6);solxl#o an + x >~z[cp,z>B(n,IF,I)]‘lbecauseof(P).Together d l I 
with (y) this contradicts our corollary to Theorem 3.3. 0 
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Theorem 3.6 applies if T is interpreted in S. The case when @ is injective is of 
special interest. The dependence on @ can be improved if more is known in T about 
S. We mention the following situation. 
Theorem 3.7. Consider again a I-calculus T to which Giidel’s second theorem applies 
and a proof system S such that the following holds: 
(a) +T q 7(x, F) + q s(xx, OF) for F E Cyu I’IY and @ homomorphic with respect 
to 1. 
(p) In T it is provable that S is a I-system. 
(y) In T it is provable that Cc, is non-trivial with respect to S and F*. 
l-hen 6 LB,JF,). 
Proof in T. Assume LB,,(F,); then 
q T(X, F) A q r(y, 1F) + O&x, @F) A Q&Y, l@F) by (a) 
+ q s(Ps(xx, XY, TFnl), E) by (PI 
by copying the proof of Theorem 3.3. Contradiction. 0 
Remark. A suitable formulation of the arguments above can be carried out for 
quantifier-free calculi. 
We now turn to the Gentzen-like non-l-calculi mentioned previously. Our 
prototype is Kreisel’s and Takeuti’s CFA [13]. First we show that CFA is not a 
I-calculus. Assume the contrary; then 
+CFA lv% Y %FA&FA(Xv Y, IGIL G) + ConCFA. 
But if we take 1G E Zz to be a true closed formula then the premise is provable in 
CFA and therefore tcr, Con,,,. This is, however, false (for details see [13, p. 191). 
In Gentzen-like calculi, the subformula property plays an important role. We say 
that a theory has the Zy (II:)-subformula property if in all proofs any 2: (II?)-parts 
are preceded by subformulas. 
Theorem 3.8. Consider a r.e. Gentzen-like theory S such that the X7-subformulaproperty 
is provable in S and Giidel’s second theorem holds. 
(i) For each d > 0 and each function f in S there is a sequence F.+ of IZ$formulas 
such that ks q ,(z, F,,)+IzI>f(n)+dIF,IZP’. 
(ii) ks Xi-Con,. S is not a I-calculus. 
(iii) The II:-subformula property does not hold in S. 
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Proof. (i) Consider F,, = r\E’,“’ P with P prime and parentheses to the right and 
N(n) chosen suitably large as indicated below. Because of the subformula property, 
F,, has essentially the following proof z: 
N-2 
p, A p 
i=l 
N-l 
p, A p 
i=l 
ip 
i=l 
We have 
JzJ=(NJPJ+N-l)+(NjPj+N-2)+* * .+(2)PJ+o) 
=~P~(N+AJ+(N-l)+~~ .+2)+(N-l)-t(N-2)+. * *-to 
?(JPJ+l)(N+- . -+1)-l=&V+l)N(\PJ+l)-1. 
~~~~f(n)+d(N(~P~+l))~-‘>f(n)+d~F,~~-’ now follows from 
tN2(JPJ+l)3f(n)+dN2-‘(JPJ+1)2-’ or 
N” IpI+ f(n) 
-~NZ”+d(lP\+1)2-‘. 
2 
The latter holds if N is sufficiently large. 
(ii) By induction on x using the subformula property for FE I;:: 
t--s Provdx, [Fl) +Tr( [Fl); 
thus 
+S Provdx, [Fl) * Provh, I+l> + W FFl) A W [iFI) 
The second assertion follows by an argument similar to the one given for CFA above. 
(iii) Assume the lI:-subformula property. The argument in (ii) now yields 
Es X:-Con, contrary to Godel’s second theorem. 0 
Remark. The C:-subformula property is quite natural for Gentzen-style reasoning; 
the II:-subformula property usually results from w-rules which make recursive 
enumeration impossible. 
Thus, on the one hand, proofs in Gentzen-like calculi S proceed systematically 
without any surprises and are therefore mostly long-winded. These methods of 
making proofs are so uniform that natural lower bounds on proof complexity in 
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this part of S can be proved in S. On the other hand, because of its recursive 
enumerability, there are special short-cuts in S. Details are open at present. 
4. Sequences of formulas having non-trivial lower bounds on proof complexity 
Here we study calculi T such that (5) is valid (e.g. calculi of types (A) and (B)) 
and (*) search for recursive sequences F* of formulas in T such that q ?(z, F,,) + Iz[ > 
$(n, IF& where $(n, [F~~)-[F~I is unbounded. 
Remark. If this property of $ results mainly from its dependence on n (as in 
+(n, x) = n +x) the set {F,,} may be finite; then all elements of the sequence F* 
occurring infinitely often are unprovable. Otherwise the set {F,,} has to be infinite 
and 1 F, I + 00 because the alphabet of T is finite. 
The lower bound in (*) is so weak that it is easy to find many sets of formulas 
for which it is satisfied. In theories of the type (Bl) having a standard model these 
lower bounds constitute a new class of formally undecidable mathematical proposi- 
tions. If the arguments establishing (*) are sufficiently simple, then there will be so 
many examples of such sequences F* that there is a conflict with formalistic ideals 
(see Section 1). 
The first example that comes to mind is the case where, for all n, the formula F, 
is unprovable in T. Here LB,,(F,) holds for an arbitrary function I/J. In the next 
interesting case the sequence Fe contains only provable formulas. (All intermediate 
cases reduce to these extremes.) Here (*) has a solution in each theory T where 
there are minimal proofs whose length above the end formula is arbitrarily large. 
In our experience this is the case in all stronger mathematical theories. (Note that 
when the part of the proof above the end formula cannot exceed a certain maximal 
length, then the theory is decidable.) Without further investigation of T the sequences 
F* and the functions II, remain unknown in this general solution of (*). Next we 
explicitly give sequences F.+ and functions $ for known theories T with several 
measures of proof complexity. 
Our point of view differs from that of other previous examples of lower bounds 
on proof complexity. In the literature large lower bounds on the time needed for 
proofs have been established, often with the use of intricate arguments (e.g. 
[5,7, Chap 5, 161). The sequences F.+ considered have usually been special cases, 
e.g. trivial, unknown, or particular sequences. We are interested in finding small 
non-trivial bounds Cc, (no matter how small I,!J is, LB,, is unprovable). In this case 
there are very many sequences F* which satisfy (*). The basic idea is the following. 
The usual formal proofs need a minimum of symbols. Consider for example provable 
formulas F,, which begin with a quantifier Q and are not axioms. Such formulas 
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are customarily inferred with the use of the following rules. 
A(r) A(u) -. -. @A(x) c &A(x). & B + @A(x). 
VMx) ’ AxA ’ @A(x) ’ @A(x) ’ 
B A @A(x). 
@A(x) ’ 
lQicA<t;x) (Q” dual to Q); 
AY@A(x, Y). 
C?xA(x, t) ’ 
B c B(u) 
B v ‘2, @A(x), @A(x). VYNYL @A(x). llQxA(x) 
@A(x) ’ @A(x) ’ WA(x) ’ 
Let L denote the lower formula and let formulas U, be the upper formulas. Because 
L or a direct subformula of L occurs in at least one U, the following holds: 
ILI< : I.Jl+c. (6) 
r=l 
Remarks. (i) This property (6) holds also for conjunctions and the general form 
(6”) below holds for negations. 
(ii) Note that, since the theory T is consistent, the I-rule cannot be applied and 
hence our argument can only be formalized in a theory proving Con,. 
We first seek a lower bound 1+4 for sequences F.+ whose proofs use no definitions. 
If z proves F,, = L then according to (6) we obtain 
This type of argument solves (*) very generally because non-trivial quantifiers always 
refer semantically to matrices and occurrences of variables and terms in preceding 
formulas (subformula property) and hence an inequality of type (6) is justified. For 
example (6) can be weakened to 
ILl<@( E l”il) (6’) i=l 
where @ is monotone increasing; now IzI > ILI+ W'(ILI) is a solution of (*). Even 
weaker is 
(Y(L) < @(I4 - ILI) (6”) 
where @ is again monotone increasing and (Y counts something in L, for instance 
the number of quantifiers. A solution of (*) is now obtained under the additional 
condition (Y(L) 2 @( (cl( n, I L() - I LI) on (Y as follows: 
@($(n, IF,/) +,I) s Q(F,) (a-condition) 
< @+I - IF,)) (6”) 
and hence ~c~(~,IF,I)<IF,I+IzI-IF~~=IzI. 
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Example. Take (Y(F,) to be the number of quantifiers and O(x) =x + c as in (6). 
Then (6”) holds for the rules above. Let $( n, x) = (1 + E)X. The condition on (Y then 
becomes (Y(F,,)~(~+E)~F,~-~F,~+c=F~F,,~+c. For small E this can be fulfilled. 
Thus as far as we can see today, every non-trivial quantifier proof reflects a 
minimum of semantical information ensuring a non-trivial lower bound on proof 
complexity. Thus non-trivial quantified F,, which are not quasi-axioms are solutions 
of (*). The only way we know to escape this LB,-incompleteness in an extension 
Tt of T is to take almost all of the formulas F,, as quasi-axioms in Tt thus ensuring 
lLB,+,,(G,) f or all infinite subsequences G, of F* instead of deriving them from 
subformulas which would give true but unprovable LB.+,,( G,) (see (D) in Section 
1). This proves (C) and (D) and yields (E). 
Taken literally our arguments above only work for calculi of type (A). In calculi 
of type (B) without definitions we must seek functions $ and sequences F.+ such 
that cCl(n, IF,I)-21F,I is unbounded (see Section 3). Now somewhat longer proofs 
have to be considered. As an example we do this for theories T whose only rule is 
modus ponens. Then (*) holds for formulas F,, that cannot be inferred from axioms 
of the form V+F, where IVIS~(IF~I) and cp(lF,,l)+c~ as new. Such formulas F,, 
can only have proofs z in T of the following form: 
1 ti, W+ti+F, 
V F’F” withIVI>cp(lF,I) or V 
n 
“‘> 
n 
In either case lz(>2)F,,I+min(2cp(lF,(), IF,I)= +(IF,,I). 
Next we include definitions. In practice not only languages but also definienda 
are generated within a finite alphabet. Their lengths LY and 6 respectively, are usually 
32. Definitions are given once and for all and do not vary from proof to proof. 
They always shorten the proof and should be applied whenever possible. The lengths 
IzI and IFI f p f o a roo z and a formula F are now taken to be the lengths lzDl and 
1~~1 of the modified proof and formula obtained by using the definitions whenever 
possible plus the length d of the definitions employed plus IFI - 1~~1 where in case 
of a proof F is the endformula. 
Now we assume that all formulas F, are distinct and each begins with a quantifier 
Qx, and that each is not an axiom but is derivable in T. For the last step in a proof 
z we have 
(7) 
i=l 
where LD = F,,, and d’s d is the length of the definitions involved in the last two 
lines. Because Qx itself cannot be shortened with the use of definitions, these 
definitions either involve the whole of F,,, or its matrix. By taking recursive 
subsequences it suffices to consider the following two extreme cases. 
Case 1: In all F,,D, definitions at most concern the matrix. This situation for 
(D)-formulas is similar to the one in (6) above for formulas without definitions. 
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Thus from (7) we obtain the following solution of (*): 
~zI>21~,,I-c+~‘+l~,I-l~,,I~I~,I+I~,,I-c~ICI(I~,I). 
The +-condition holds because IF,,~~ + co as n *CO by our choice of F,, . The situation 
is similar for (6’) and (6”). 
Case 2: F,,, is a dejined symbol for all n. Again we consider the last step in a 
proof z of F,,. This is either the definition of F,,, or one of the above inferences 
where F,, also occurs in an upper formula. Because definitions shorten the length 
of the proof we obtain in each case 
IZI>21F~DI+df+IF,I-(F,,I~IF,I+IF,,I~(Cr(lF,I) 
which solves (*) (see Case 1). 
We have now proved claims (C), (D) and (E) for theories where definitions may 
be used. However the functions I+!J are not given explicitly. An estimate from below 
of lFnDl in terms of IF,, is missing. For that purpose we distinguish the following 
two cases. 
Case A: Finitely many dejinitions of total length d are employed in the set {F,,u}. 
This can only occur in Case 1 above. The arguments there combined with 1~~1~ 
1~~~1.2 then yield Iz~>(~+~~‘)~F,I-c~~(IF,I). 
Case B: Injinitely many dejnitions are used in the set {F,,,}. Choose an infinite 
recursive subsequence G,D such that each formula in G,D uses a new defined symbol 
whose definition is not shorter than those applied previously in the sequence. This 
new symbol occurs among the definition, hence 
IzI>IG~DI+~,+IG,I-IG,D(=(G,I+~, 
where 1, denotes the length of this new definiendum. 
(8) 
Next consider all definienda in lexicographic order. There can be at most 6 of 
length one, 6’ of length two, etc., where the definitions are written in an alphabet 
containing 6 symbols. Thus the number D( 1) of definitions of length < 1 is estimated 
by 
D(l)~s(1+6+~~ .+6’-‘)<26’. (9) 
According to our construction 1, is not smaller than the length of the nth definiendum. 
So n s D(1,) and by (9) 1, > (log n -log 2)log-‘6 = lin(log n). Consequently (8) 
gives IzI > IG,J+lin(log n). Hence in all of our examples we may take $(n, x) = 
x + lin(log n). 
For later purposes we need to determine I/J as a function of x only (x = IF,I). 
Hence we seek a lower bound on log n in terms of IF,,~ or, more simply, we seek 
0 such that @(IFJ) 4 n. The best @ is given by the number of all possible F, 
preceding F,, in some natural ordering compatible with the length of F,,. Our F,, 
are essentially prenex formulas, and a realistic theory T should contain at least 
I-polynomially many of them of length 1 to express our effective knowledge about 
the exponentially many prenex formulas of length 1 in usual systems of notation. 
Hence we obtain n 2 cl~,,l~ or log n >lin(loglt;;,I). Thus in all of our examples we 
may use $(x) = x + lin(log x). 
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Remark. There are many further measures of proof complexity other than the ones 
discussed above. For example one can consider definitions in each proof separately. 
Here all instances of a proof scheme using variables for formulas will have the same 
complexity and thus new arguments based on longer proofs are necessary for 
non-trivial LBT. In our experience each stronger mathematical theory will have such 
bounds (compare Sections 5 and 6), but a construction of F.+ and I,!J will depend 
on the details of the measure of proof complexity and the theory considered. 
The examples of sequences F.+ which we have given above are wide-ranging 
and general. We conclude by giving some particular explicit examples where the 
sequences are constructed according to two sorts of principles involving 
(i) the meaning of the formula 
(ii) the logical form of the formula. 
Simple examples result from a true formula F by adding trivial quantifiers, e.g. 
F,,=Qx,... Q-s ii, xi = xi. 
A less trivial example of type (i) starts from a true Xi-formula 
F= VfAn&(_& n), 
A, quantifier-free. According to Enderton [4] one can effectively find an equivalent 
formula with Henkin-quantifiers 
,_AXVY 
Au vv [B(x, u; Y, ~11 
where B is a first order formula. These quantifiers denote simultaneous independent 
Skolem functions: Ho Vf; g Ax, u B(x, u;fx, gu). Now (see [l]) all first order 
consequences of H can already be inferred from the so-called first order approxima- 
tions A,,, of H, where 
&=/\x,, Ul VY,, 01 . . . lh?l, &?I VY,, %I 
;C B(Xiy Ui;yi, Vi)/\ i (Xi=X,+yi=yj)A K (Ui=Uj+Vi=Vj) 
i=* i,j= 1 i,j=l I 
and H+A,, A,+,+A,,,, H+GeV m:A, + G for first order G. We can take F* 
to be a sequence of such first order approximations to F. We mention some examples 
of true I;-formulas F = i/f An A,(_fn, n): 
(4 F = +-existence 
* HE IkY vz 
Au vVw[b=uAY= v+z=w)h(X=0+Z=y) 
9 
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(c) An example with a non-recursive f is Kleene’s primitive recursive predicate 
A,, which is well-founded on all recursive O,l-paths but not on all O,l-paths: V 
non-recursive f An lA,(sgfn, n). 
Boolean formulas yield an example of type (ii). They have been studied with 
special attention given to complexity. We translate them directly into arithmetic and 
thus into T as follows: 
Boolean F Arithmetic B(F) 
V X 
l(G) B(G)+1 
GAH B(G). B(H) 
Because 
@F(Q) ++ @ < 1: B( F(g)) = 1 (mod 2) 
t, 0~~1 vy: B(F(_v))+l=2.y, 
we define B( @F(p)) by this last formula. Using Ivariable = 1 we obtain the following 
lengths: l~(F)l=l~l d h an w en n is the number of quantifiers 
IQ_vF(_v)l<lB(Q_vF(_v))l~2n+IO+IQ_vF(_v)l~~.IQ_vF(_v)l, 
where c < 6 and approaches 1 for non-trivial F. So in T exactly all valid (translated 
quantified) Boolean formulas are provable. Now take F* to be a sequence of such 
quantified Boolean formulas. Then (*) holds for the translated formulas B(F,,). 
From this we obtain a solution of (*) for F,, using the estimates on complexity given 
above. 
5. Relation to Cook’s thesis 
Consider a I-calulus T which is polynomially axiomatizable over an alphabet 
of length cy such that Godel’s second theorem holds. Assume the following: Vu A 
quantified Boolean F 
(+-T F) * Vx(lxl s IFI + a 1oglFl A 17,(x, F)). 
Then the Boolean part of T, and hence SAT and TAUT, are polynomially decidable. 
We only need to check all possible proofs of F of length I< a logIF where F is 
not counted in the length 1. There are at most (CX + 6)” ‘Og’F1 = I FI” ‘og(ats) such proofs 
where 6 is the length of the alphabet in which the definitions are expressed, and 
the time taken to check each proof is polynomial in 1. 
Remark. In Frege-Hilbert calculi T whose only rule is modus ponens the bound 
[Flfa logIF b a ove can be replaced by 21 Fl+ a log1 FI. Modify the above argument 
by distinguishing whether F is an axiom or not; in the second case F appears twice 
at the end of its proofs. 
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Using the assumption that T is consistent, we replace provability t, in the above 
decidability result by validity k and obtains SAT, TAUTE P, which contradicts 
Cook’s thesis NP # P. Thus if we accept Cook’s thesis, at least the following Boolean 
lower bound is valid in T: 
Aa V quantified Boolean F, {(kTFa) A Ax(U,(x, F,) + 1x1) (F,(+a log(F,()}. 
These recursive sequences {F,} consists of infinitely many valid Boolean formulas. 
By (Bl) none of their lower bounds can be derived in any stronger theory T known 
today. We do not have any of these sequences explicitly. Nevertheless our concrete 
examples of Boolean formulas in Section 4 provide similar lower bounds and thus 
support Cook’s thesis in a new way. This proves (Fl). 
To obtain (F2) we simply formalize the above argument arithmetically in T. If 
(NP # P)T denotes SAT@ P where validity + is replaced by provability Ed., then 
v-r (NPZ P)p 
6. T-unprovable meta-theorems 
6.1. Undecidability of T 
Consider a language L, a recursive class 3 of formulas in L and a I-calculus T 
over L such that Giidel’s second theorem holds. Take a class 0 of recursive functions 
which contains the characteristic function of &bounded searches for proofs in T 
of FE 3 similar to the one given in Section 5. Then the argument of Section 5 carries 
over to this more general situation showing in T that 6-undecidability of T on g 
implies: for any f E 0 there is a recursive sequence Fyc G 2 which has lower bound 
f on proof complexity in T. This is a general method for deriving lower bounds on 
proof complexity and substantiates our remark in the beginning of (C). Since such 
lower bounds are unprovable in T we have 
bLTIVfEOAFE~[(tTF)~f(rFl)=Ol. 
(If one is only interested in this fact one may argue more directly as was pointed 
out by a referee: since T is a I-calculus 
tT v-? Y, G(nT(xy G) A &(Y, 1G)) + /iF: q TF and 
Thus for all theories T of type (Bl) which have a standard model and are &- 
undecidable on 3 this undecidability is formally independent of T. For instance 
this applies to all theories T containing Robinson’s Q or standard theories with + 
and ., and all classes Q and 3 where {characteristic functions of Q-bounded proof 
searches in T for formulas in z} c Q E {recursive functions} and either 3 = language 
of T or {diophantine predicates} c ;F E T-language. 
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6.2. Examples resulting from proof-theoretic II:-uniformity 
See Section 2 for the definition of this notion. If Ax F(x) is true but unprovable 
in T (e.g. Con, is a formula of this type) then II:-uniformity implies An Vm [all 
proofs of F(fi,) in T have > n lines]. Thus F,, = F(fi,) has the non-trivial lower 
bound on proof complexity 1 F,,I + n - 1. Therefore in all theories T of type (Bl) 
with a standard model where II:-uniformity holds (see [lo]) these true LB,,_,_,( F.+) 
are independent of T. 
6.3. Proof speed-ups 
We only need the following weak version of a proof speed-up Tt of T: /I 
increasing function cp, infinitely many (different) formulas F,,An, x[OT(x, F,,) + 
VY,,(~T+(Y~, Fn]A d~~n~)+~E~+l)l. Ob . viously, such a proof speed-up yields a 
non-trivial lower bound on proof complexity in T because F,, is the end formula 
of the proof y,, IF,1 + CO and therefore ly,,l+ ~0. Thus in all theories T of type (Bl) 
with a standard model, all proof speed-ups of T are formally independent of T. 
Examples can be taken from [3, 8, 15, 161. 
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